imagination it seems almost an age'. Tristram, letting us know what this far into the novel we have surely already suspected, continues:
Though my father said 'he knew not how it happened' yet he knew very well how it happened; and at the instant he spoke it, was pre-determined in his mind, to give my uncle Toby a clear account of the matter by a metaphysical dissertation upon the subject of duration and its simple modes, in order to show my uncle Toby, by what mechanism and mensurations in the brain it came to pass, that the rapid succession of their ideas and the eternal scampering of the discourse from one thing to another, since Dr Slop had come into the room, had lengthened out so short a period, to so inconceivable an extent -'I know not how it happened, -cried my father -but it seems an age.' (3, 18, 222) The 'eternal scampering' from one thing to another here decelerates in an intentionally slowwitted sentence that begins with Tristram citing his father in order to reveal the thought behind his words, and ends with a repetition of his father speaking those words. The 'rapid succession of their ideas' that had, at least for Walter, made the two hours and ten minutes seem an age, is itself stated in a line that induces the sense of time passing unnecessarily not in a surfeit of thoughts but in something like their absence. Scarcely no ideas are in play, save the plodding introduction and repetition of the topic.
'I know not how it happened, -cried my father -but it seems an age.' -'Tis owing, entirely, quoth my uncle Toby, to the succession of our ideas.' (3, 18, 222) Tristram's description of Walter's intention to reflect on the temporality of our inner experience of the succession of ideas, a description that has already made use of the phrase, returns to the scene it is recounting at just that moment when Toby interjects by announcing and naming 'the succession of ideas'. And Walter's (and Tristram's) response?
(M)y father, who had an itch in common with all philosophers, of reasoning upon everything which happened, and accounting for it too -proposed infinite pleasure to himself in this, of the succession of ideas, and had not the least apprehension of having it snatched out of his hands by my uncle Toby, who (honest man) generally took everything as it happened -and who, of all men in the world, troubled his brain least with abstruse thinking; the ideas of time and space, or how we came by those ideas or of what stuff they were made, -or whether they were born with us -or we picked them up afterwards as we went along, -or whether we did it in frocks, -or not till we had got into breeches -with a thousand other enquiries and disputes about INFINITY, PRESCIENCE, LIBERTY, NECESSITY, and so forth, upon whose desperate and unconquerable theories so many fine heads have been turned and cracked, -never did my uncle Toby's the least injury at all. (3, 18, 223) Rather than permitting Walter to continue with his intended disquisition, Tristram chooses to list the concepts such a disquisition might have properly treated, and he does so by referring them to Toby rather than Walter. It is thus Toby's name and Toby's indifference to philosophy that prompts Tristram's philosophical and Lockean litany. It seems in keeping with the tenor of the passage to labour the point. Walter, pretending to be surprised at how slowly the time has gone, prepares to explain the phenomenon. Tristram intervenes to explain the pretence and outline the intention. Toby interrupts to give the correct technical name of the phenomenon. Initially, this naming and interrupting fail to distract Walter. Toby's 'the succession of our idea', the solution to the problem Walter is feigning surprise at, is simply heard as his own. For Tristram's purposes, however, the fact of its being Toby's utterance leads to a description of Toby's lack of interest in any attempt to explain either the succession of our ideas (the very doctrine he has named) or the various metaphysical problems and themes raised by its introduction and identification. And it is under Toby's name that we find those problems and themes being listed, and among them, crucially, the matter of innate ideas. Tristram draws our attention to Walter's appropriating of Toby's words and then, as though in recompense, re-appropriates Walter's philosophical interests for the sake of Gracious heaven! cried my father, looking upwards and clasping his two hands together, -there is a worth in thy honest ignorance, brother Toby, -'twere almost a pity to exchange it for a knowledge -But I'll tell thee. - (3, 18, Toby's cheerful admission that he does not understand the words and the doctrine he has correctly identified helps us see that the phrase Walter was inclined to take as his own ('the succession of our ideas') before recognising it as Toby's actually was Walter's phrase all along. Toby, familiar with his brother's speeches, knows the name of the solution and the doctrine, but no relevant ideas of his own accompany the name. Tristram turns our attention back to Walter and to Walter's isolation not simply as a consequence of his intellectual egotism but as a sort of loneliness. Walter recognises Toby's voice but also realises that what it has said is no more than a spur to Walter's peroration, a way of keeping him on track, an encouragement even an affectionate one, but also a means of returning Walter to his world and his interests (his hobbyhorse) so as to allow Toby the peace of returning to his own. On this reading, Toby's 'the succession of our ideas' is nothing but the mechanical repetition of Walter's 'the succession of our ideas'. If Sterne has Tristram refrain from making this explicit in a passage that exemplifies Tristram's frequently ruinous explicitnesss, it is to give the mechanical its human or sentimental aspect. An easy companionship leads the words of the one to emerge from the mouth of the other. Finally we come to Walter's Lockean 'dissertation', complete with footnote ('Vide Locke'). Toby's interruptions ('What is that to anybody', 'You puzzle me to death') are now unequivocally in his own voice.
The argument unfolds. To understand infinity, we need to understand duration; duration, considered as the internal awareness of the succession of ideas, leads us to an understanding of ourselves as existing, the self being a function of the succession of ideas.
An image for this succession is required, and Walter proposes 'the images in the inside of a lanthorn turned round by the heat of a candle'. Toby offers an alternative, 'a smoak-jack', and the dissertation comes to a halt. 4 Tristram, devoting a chapter to the repercussions, writes 'What a conjecture was here lost! My father in one of his best explanatory moods. ... my uncle in one of the finest dispositions for it in the world' (3, 19, 225 And even the specific engagement with Locke's treatment of wit and judgement, itself arguably an unfair interpretation of Locke, doesn't seem to reflect in any way on the conversation preceding the preface. 5 Attempts to bolster the philosophical achievements of the sequence might claim that there are at least two implicit anti-Lockean arguments here.
One reduces Locke's metaphysics to the solipsism to which his accounts of ideas and the communication of ideas seem bound. The other gives a neo-Humean or quasi-Wittgensteinian gloss to the context of the shared life and history we encounter in the novel, the lived contexts of misunderstandings and of improbable and impossible affections. 6 But were we to work out either of these in detail and read it alongside the sequence, it would sound just as vulnerable to ridicule. We are not given enough of Locke for us to interpret the sequence plausibly as a piece of anti-Lockean philosophy, and any philosophy presented as Locke's has been here would sound just as unconvincing.
But perhaps we go wrong in trying to reconstitute the Shandyean undermining or challenging of Locke at the level of these chapters and this sequence. Might it not be best to contrast the To turn back to Locke's Essay after reading Sterne's novel is to find oneself detecting Shandyean voices and gestures almost everywhere: from the etiquettes of the frontispiece where we meet John Locke, gentleman, to the epistle to the reader and the frequent subsequent appeals and apologies to the same reader for having to repeat, qualify and revise so much of the material, to the surprised confession that a book on understanding should have to devote a section to the topic of words. Some of these belong to the contingencies and conventions of printing, patronage, and pedagogy, but some seem to touch the very heart of Locke's endeavour. A book that would follow an individual attempt to reach selfunderstanding will rely on no pre-determined methods, laws, or concepts (no innate ideas). It will show how the acquisition of each part of our knowledge can be explained in terms of experience: the complex ideas arising from the simple ideas, and the simple ideas from immediate experience. And it will do so in such a way that the reader or student can first observe how knowledge and complexity arises and then come, in reflection, to understand themselves. For the self is reflective as soon as it apprehends a simple idea, and reflecting on this apprehension comes to apprehend reflection as such as the promise and possibility of self-understanding. So much follows from a simple attentiveness to what is present in a mind. Locke insists that it is precisely the absence of innate ideas, the fact that we do not need to theorise or appeal to a knowledge already present at birth, that makes the self accessible to a genuine understanding. The history Locke will tell will be the inner history of the one who tells it, and it will be a human history and its outcome will be a human understanding that will have no cause to deem itself lacking or unworthy. In this context, any emendations or expressions of surprise about having to add topics, chapters, and 'books' might serve to check the optimism of the undertaking. That it never seems to do so can, after If it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the Subject; for when I first put Pen to Paper, I thought all I should have to say on this Matter, would have been contained in one sheet of Paper; but the farther I went, the larger Prospect I had: New discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is; and that some Parts might be contracted: the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of Interruption, being apt to cause some Repetitions. But to confess the Truth, I am now too lazie, or too busie to make it shorter. 7 But however enlightening it is to bring the Essay alongside the novel in this manner, again can anything here function as an argument? The amusement to be had from observing the contingencies and ironies that befall the Essay are acknowledged ruefully by Locke himself.
That Sterne chooses to make those features central to his novel gives it an extraordinary license to ridicule Locke (and philosophy) but it is difficult to determine any greater significance for its relation to Locke or philosophy. To the extent that we see Sterne as either arguing with or ridiculing Locke, there is no need to return to the Essay after reading the novel unless to be newly amused by it or to acknowledge its historical role and context. The remainder of this paper will try to trace a different line back from novel to Essay, suggesting that we can, after and thanks to Sterne, discern a moment or mood in the Essay that might otherwise have been missed, a moment or mood that in its Lockean treatment also helps us grasp something about the novel.
'Uneasiness' is perhaps not a word we are aware of encountering in Tristram Shandy. But in the first volume we do read of Walter's 'scruples and uneasinesses' concerning the location and the quality of Mrs Shandy's 'lying-in' (1, 18, 51), and the preparations for Tristram's birth and the first weeks of his life. Walter's concern is threefold, taking in not only the wellbeing of wife and child, but also the protecting of Walter himself from criticism should there be any error or misfortune, and the example Walter can set by demonstrating the public and political benefit of remaining in the country and of eschewing the 'current of men and money towards the metropolis'. The 'scruples and uneasinesses' as they stretch beyond the empathies and egotism respectively of the first two of these to the more abstract but doubtless equally egotistical third turn into an extreme anxiety. Walter, contemplating the fate and the dissemination of the principle on the basis of which he wants to think he has made his decision as to what is best for Mrs Shandy and Tristram, is 'extremely anxious' (1, 18, 52).
'Anxious' is another word scarcely used in the novel. When it is, it singles out Walter, be it as now when he is worrying about the 'lying-in' or, as later (which is to say earlier), when he is caught up in the complexities of having to deal with both Bobby's educational travels and the management of the Ox-moor. In each case, Walter is rescued from his uneasiness or anxiety, however extreme, by a catastrophe: Tristram's botched birth and baptism in the one, and Bobby's death in the other. The scruples, uneasinesses, and anxieties at issue are those of a character (and characters) attempting to negotiate a path away from trauma and catastrophe.
They disclose the parameters and qualities of a life increasingly caught up in its own attempts to alleviate them, and to alleviate them in an activity that derives solely from the private interests and passions (the hobby-horses) of the uneasy and anxious individual. And they seem bound to fail, after all it is Walter's intellectualising, the very thing that gives his life even the hope of a pleasing ease or order, that exacerbates his anxiety. 'What is the life of man! Is it not to shift from side to side? -from sorrow to sorrow? -to button up one cause of vexation! -and unbutton another' (4, 31, 399).
'Vexation' is a word the novel seems more willing to emphasise. Recounting his mishaps in Lyons, Tristram states that 'to those who call vexations, VEXATIONS, as knowing what they are, there could not be a greater, than to be the best part of a day (in) ...
the most opulent and flourishing city in France -and not be able to see it' (7, 30, 625) . The play between use and mention (the vexation of vexation and the vexation of VEXATION) is brought to the fore in a written illustration:
To be withheld upon any account must be a vexation; but to be withheld by a vexation -must certainly be what philosophy justly calls VEXATION upon VEXATION (7, 30, 625) If neither Tristram nor Sterne is inclined to let 'uneasiness' name and characterise these vexations and the vexatious to and fro that seems essential to the uneasy balance of a human life, the same cannot be said for the philosophers. It is a word that plays a substantial role in the moral psychologies of Locke and Hume, and it is a word that clearly intrigues Leibniz who, reading and responding to Locke in his New Essays, searches for an appropriate French or German translation. 8 'Uneasiness' is not a word that belongs to the novel, nevertheless Sterne will use it in an important and highly charged reference to the novel and to the writing of the novel, and in such a manner that it is difficult not to find oneself thinking of Locke. It occurs in a letter Sterne sends, along with copies of the first volumes of the novel, to his patron Lord Rockingham.
There is an Anecdote relating to this ludicrous Satyr, which I must tell your Lord! -& it is this, 'that it was every word of it wrote in an affliction; & under a constant uneasiness of mind. Cervantes wrote his humorous Satyr in a Prison -and Scarron his, in pain and Anguish -such Philosophers as will account for everything, may explain this to me. 9 There are significant differences in the connotations and implications of 'uneasiness' for Locke, Leibniz, and Hume, and in the descriptive and explanatory work each of them requires the word to do. Ultimately for Hume and Leibniz, the mental or emotional states or the varied phenomena we might call 'uneasinesses' pose no deep philosophical or psychological problem. For Locke, however, 'uneasiness' generates as many puzzles and ambiguities as it resolves, and it is to Locke's 'uneasiness' we want to turn with the help and encouragement of Sterne's novel and with the way the novel extensively and repetitively represents these puzzles and ambiguities even in the absence of the word itself. In both the novel and the Essay, uneasiness may find a temporary alleviation in repose, reverie, or easy companionship, and sometimes in a judgment or decision, the settling of a practical or scholarly dispute, that can count as the completion of a process of reasoning.
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The problem first arises when Locke realises that he had been mistaken in thinking that the absence of the good, say, is enough to cause and guide the search to achieve or acquire the good. If that were the case then, along with the felt absence, I would already have to possess an idea of what it was the felt absence of, and that idea would have to be strong enough to identify the absence from the very beginning, distinguishing it essentially from any other absence. But such an idea is ruled out by the argument against innateness, the argument with which the Essay has to begin. What is present in the mind cannot be the absence of the idea of the good (which absence already presupposes a different type of prior possession), but a felt absence that disturbs or affects the mind in such a way that it seeks alleviation. If what I am is a being with no other way of possessing ideas than through experience and reflecting on experience, then we need a different account of what it is to feel the lack or absence of something and a different explanation as to how that felt absence can orient a person towards that thing.
To return then to the Enquiry, what is it that determines the Will in regard to
our Actions? And that upon second thoughts I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view: But some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a Man in at present under. This is that which successively determines the Will, and sets us upon those Actions, we perform. This Uneasiness we may call, as it is, Desires, which is an This 'uneasiness' proves remarkably difficult to define but, having introduced the term, Locke makes it do a lot of work. The determining of the will is no longer the idea of an absent good, but an uneasiness. This uneasiness is not to be understood as a cognition, but as an affectivity with a capacity to orient the person so affected. It is not however to be simply identified with or defined in terms of desire, although wherever there is a desire, there is always also an uneasiness. It is only with reference to uneasiness, that we can begin to understand the self as motivated to seek satisfaction or rest, but to the extent that no idea can be found in the mind that is separable from this drama of uneasiness, an idea too is proximally an uneasiness. Ideas are everywhere and always bound up with uneasinesses and the constant 'succession of ideas' is also always a succession of uneasinesses. If a person or self is a function of that succession, then a person or self is disclosed in its essential uneasiness. 'Person', for Locke, is a 'forensic' term. It appropriates and locates actions and laws. To be a person is to have an identity and a consciousness (an identity by means of consciousness) as a reasoning, law-governed, experiencing agent. 11 But this experience and agency always has its mood or affective character, its uneasiness. The experience of the passing of time (duration) has its mood or its disposition, its uneasiness, and it is present in the mind only as this felt uneasiness.
The most satisfying alleviation of the disturbance caused by the absence of the good would be the acquisition of the good, but the primary felt concern is with treating and curtailing the disturbance, the feeling of pain or displeasure, and there are many other things and distractions which might be able to do that, and moreover do it in such a way as to provide a quicker or easier satisfaction. Uneasiness thus enables us to say that a person can (rationally) desire to perform a particular action (for example see to the squeaking parlour door hinge), have the mental and physical capacities and the time to do it, and yet still fail to do it. Does it help us with the problem of weakness of the will (akrasia)? The argument against innateness removes that aspect of the problem that led Plato and Socrates to deny that there could be such a state, but does uneasiness take a positive step towards solving it? We would need a whole other paper to treat this issue but, for our purposes here, we can say that, although Locke does not provide a formal solution to the problem, nor an adequately robust account of the will to extract a substantial theory of weakness of the will, what the introduction of uneasiness does is to enhance the description of a life and a person in which and for whom weakness of the will is always a risk.
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It may seem the simplest of corrections but this emphasising of uneasiness effects a change not only in the content of the Essay but also in the nature of the project itself. To seek self-understanding is to begin with the felt absence of such an understanding and to endeavour to guide and train it towards a productive and fulfilling outcome, and to give meaning to that outcome. It is the training of a self capable of accounting for itself, a matter, we might say, of conscience.
Quite a large part of the two hours and ten minutes since the arrival of Obadiah and Dr Slop that passed so slowly for Walter and prompted his disastrous attempt at a Lockean exposition were of course taken up with Obadiah's reading of Yorick's sermon. The sermon took as its text, a verse from the Epistle to the Hebrews, 'For we trust we have a good conscience'.
'Conscience' is a word that, with Locke's Essay, is only beginning the long journey that will distinguish it from 'consciousness' and give it a central role in the modern conception of subjectivity and selfhood. It nonetheless can be used to clarify an essential feature of Locke's forensic personhood. If consciousness consolidates personal identity, conscience is the possibility of an inner and integral judgment. Conscience is a person's holding themselves to account as guilty or innocent, or rather, it is that capacity of being a person that has the right to accuse and judge the person. It is also, as Yorick puts it in the sermon, 'the knowledge which the mind has within herself' of this guilt or innocence. Conscience is not a law unto itself (there is no hint of a categorical imperative) and so no particular moral principles can be derived from it. Conscience counts as no evidence for innate (moral) ideas and so only a philosophy that has broken with innateness can hope to give a satisfactory account of it. In order to negotiate its relationship with the moral principles and the religion that constitute or count as the law, conscience must be considered as a judge and its practice as the practice of judgment. Morality without religion cannot meaningfully comprehend the idea of conscience.
Religion without morality elides the difference between conscience and law. There is thus no room for a religion that would permit a priest to serve as one's conscience, no room either for a law or procedure whereby my conscience can be assuaged by penance or confession. A person's conscience is necessarily theirs. To the extent that the consequences of conscience accusing or not accusing a person of wrongdoing can be painful or pleasurable and capable of initiating a new course of action, conscience falls within the scope of uneasiness. Only a self capable of uneasiness, in the sense we have outlined above, can be said to have a conscience.
Each of these claims could and would be endorsed by both Locke and Sterne and, to the extent that they are deemed consistent with the author of the sermon in the novel, this part of the novel is straightforwardly Lockean.
Locke recognises that it seems reasonable to assert that a person can only be held responsible for actions they are conscious of having committed. Past actions that cannot be consciously assigned to the person are not actions they can be expected to account for, and it would seem that I cannot be rewarded or punished for something I am not conscious of Yorick's sermon makes a similar move from the apparent certainty of conscience as an inner voice to the practical need for scepticism about people's experiences and reports of that voice. One cannot fail to recognise the validity of one's own conscience.
If a man thinks at all, he cannot well be stranger to the true state of this account; -he must be privy to his own thoughts and desires; -he must remember his past pursuits, and know certainly the true springs and motives which, in general, have governed the actions of his life. ... In other matters we may be deceived by false appearances, but here the mind has all the evidence and facts within herself ... (2, 17, 145) The impossibility of being deceived by one's conscience also means that one has:
just grounds to believe the judgement thou hast past upon thyself is the judgment of God and nothing else but an anticipation of that righteous sentence which will be pronounced upon thee hereafter by that Being, to whom thou art finally to give an account of thy actions. It is simply a fact that guilty people are often free of any troubled or guilty conscience.
How then are to understand the verse 'For we trust we have a good conscience'?
Yorick's sermon advises us to be suspicious of any sort of particularism in our talk about conscience:
When a man tells you in any particular instances, --That such a thing goes against his conscience, -always believe he means exactly the same thing as when he tells you such a thing goes against his stomach; -a present want of appetite being generally the cause of both. In a word, -trust that man in nothing, who has not a CONSCIENCE in everything. (2, 17, 164) Just as Locke discouraged us from giving a special moral or epistemic status to statements about conscience and consciousness when reporting on our actions, so Yorick suggests particularist conscience talk be analysed and treated in the same way we would analyse and treat talk of any other likes, dislikes, and preferences. If 'conscience' is to be meaningful, nothing and no aspect of a human life is to be judged as being beyond its remit. But how could we possibly discern the presence of goodness and a good conscience in these circumstances? For Yorick, there is only one answer: by their fruits you shall know them. In the end, there are the things we say and do, produce and achieve in the world. All there is, in the end, is the good we have done or not done. And Locke would concur.
Were we comparing Locke's Essay with a sermon preached by Sterne, there would be Secondly and finally, in both the Essay and the novel, use is made of the day of the last judgment. Yorick's sermon cites it in order to underscore the confidence we ought to have in the inner divine judgment we discern as conscience. Locke mentions it in order to show how it will only be on that day that conscience will coincide with a foolproof or absolute self-evidence. The image of the last judgment nevertheless has an authority or a resonance in the reading of the sermon that is lacking or unnecessary in the Essay. If a good conscience is to be a conscience in and for everything, then on the last day one will be Essay. Uneasiness can be taken as naming a phenomenon or state that Leibniz, Hume, and
Locke can each recognise and describe. For Leibniz, it is the weighted mechanism that ensures motion as psychically and physically balanced, for Hume and Locke, the ordinary feature of a life and a self that can be understood solely from and in terms of experience. For
Leibniz, the balance-obtaining lack of balance that is a human life in motion is underwritten by the principles of reason. And for Hume, the unavoidability of uneasiness, the fact that such a state characterises our way of negotiating ourselves cognitively and morally (theoretically and practically) in the world, means that we will not and cannot find necessity, a law or principle that could extend from within us to the entire universe. For neither of these philosophers does uneasiness pose a philosophical difficulty. Either, with Leibniz, it can be understood according to the relevant a priori principles, or, with Hume, it is evidence that we ought to give up looking for a metaphysical understanding. Locke is the only one whose investigations into the uneasiness of human understanding insist on both accepting its unavoidability and insisting that necessity, necessary truth, and necessary goodness, are within the grasp of human understanding. To understand that we need to understand ourselves is compatible with an access to the universal. But the self or individual that seeks such understanding and so, from the first, is revealed in and as an uneasiness must be construed, also from the first, as much morally and theologically as cognitively. So construed it can think of itself and its life as matters for appropriate recall and judgement, something to be answered and taken responsibility for. Doubtless there are many Leibnizian and Humean arguments to be raised against the Lockean account but that has not been our concern here. This Lockean acceptance of uneasiness is the philosophical conception of a life to which Sterne's novel remains closest. It is the commitments of such a conception that extend from the Essay to the novel and that, on one reading at least, the novel helps us to recognise in the Essay.
